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The Deregulation Debate
XVILLIAM

K.

JONES*

The most pervasive issue in the burgeoning deregulation controversy is the question of who has the burden of proof and how is that
burden to be discharged? In one way or another, this question is addressed in each of the papers presented.
Critics of a regulatory program are likely to point to various costs
and burdens associated with the program, to failure of the program to
meet public expectations, and to anticipated benefits to be derived either
by eliminating the program or by revising it in major respects.
Defenders of a regulatory program are likely to claim various benefits associated with the program and to describe costs, burdens, and failures, to the extent they are conceded, as inevitable aspects of the activity
being regulated or as reasonable charges for the regulatory benefits allegedly conferred. Most importantly, the defenders of regulation will
dispute the validity of the asserted benefits of deregulation by describing
them as "unproven" and "speculative."
Ideally, some type of controlled experiment should be employed to
resolve at least some of the disputed issues. But such experimentation
rarely is practicable. Moreover, even where diverse regulatory regimes
are applicable to the same industry in different areas, the attempt to
make comparisons often is beset with difficulties presented by variables
other than the difference between regulatory programs involved.
In the face of uncertainty, the defenders of the status quo normally
carry the day, and most proposals for deregulation or major regulatory
reform fail because the proponents are unable to make a convincing case
that the change sought will provide more benefits than burdens. This
kind of negative reaction is likely to continue unless something can be
done to shift the burden of proof, at least in part.
The starting point is a recognition that specific regulatory controls,
of the type here under discussion, represent an exceptional rather than
a normal means of ordering economic activity in our society. It seems
reasonable, therefore, to inquire why a particular activity requires spe*Milton Handler Professor of Trade Regulation, Columbia University.
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cial regulatory treatment. The burden should be on the defenders of
the regulatory program to advance its rationale, in both historical and
contemporary terms. Emphasis should be placed on three elements:
(1) The justifying rationale must rest on some aspect of the activity which distinguishes that activity from those which are not similarly regulated. Thus, it should not suffice to urge that lower prices,
greater safety, or more assured supply is needed, unless some showing
is made that the regulated activity would present special problems in
these respects in the absence of regulation.
(2) The form of regulation adopted must be related to the distinct deficiency identified by the proponents of regulatory controls. Thus,
deficiencies in the availability of information may make mandatory disclosures or quality standards appropriate, but comprehensive economic
regulation probably could not be justified on this basis.
(3) The benefits to be derived from the regulatory scheme must
be public benefits. Higher prices or lower prices are not in themselves
either good or bad. The question is what is their impact on society generally. The desire of motorists for low-price gasoline and the desire of
truckers for high-level rates are both understandable. But neither represents a benefit to the public which justifies regulatory intervention unless
something more is involved than robbing Peter to pay Paul.
This does not appear to be an unreasonable initial burden to place
on the proponents of regulation. As a former regulator, it is a burden
that I would be prepared to assume. And it is one which sets the proper
frame of reference for ensuing deliberations. In some instances, regulatory regimes would have great difficulty passing muster under this
initial scrutiny: trucking and airlines seem the most notable in this
category. In other cases, I would expect this initial burden to be carried to an extent that would require a response from the critics of
regulation.
In addition to seeking to negate showings made by the regulatory
proponents under the initial issues (distinctiveness, relatedness, and public purpose), the critics should assume the burden of proof on a number
of additional issues:
(1) that the benefits sought to be achieved by the regulatory program have not been achieved, or have not been achieved in significant
measure;
(2) that the costs of the regulatory program, both direct and indirect, are excessive in relation to the benefits achieved (if any); and
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(3) that some alternative arrangement (including complete deregulation) would achieve a better relation of costs and benefits.
As indicated at the outset, this is a difficult burden to sustain. But
there are regulated activities in which the benefits and burdens are so
disparate that critics of the regulatory process may be expected to fare
reasonably well. I have in mind such enterprises as railroads and natural
gas production.
This leaves some activities in which the evidence probably will be
close and where regulatory controls will be maintained while the debate
continues. Conventional public utility regulation of monopoly enterprises
is hardly an unmitigated success. But neither does it reveal evidence of
chronic failure. More importantly, the alternatives advanced all pose
problems of their own, and some appear to be wholly impracticable.
Broadcast regulation raises issues that are probably distinct from
those of other regulatory regimes because of substantial discrepancies
in individual normative judgments and the lack of any clear consensus
on what is desirable and what is undesirable. But even here there are
better and worse ways of doing things, and the pressure for change (in
the direction of less regulatory control for the most part) may well be
successful. I have in mind developments in the area of cable television,
pay television, and possible separation of some program responsibilities
from the networks.
I conclude by expressing agreement with those who observe that
deregulation is not inevitably the correct answer. I also join in the
familiar theme that such regulatory activities as are retained can, and
should, be made to function more effectively. Without going into detail
on this final point, I would emphasize four essentials: (a) clear legislative direction as to the regulatory purpose to be achieved; (b) adequate resources (particularly personnel) to achieve that purpose; (c) substantial flexibility in the mode of implementing the regulatory program;
and (d) qualified individuals in charge of the program, who can grasp
both the nature of the problems presented and the soundness of available solutions-including the wisdom of reducing regulation in appropriate circumstances.

